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ABSTRACT
The Paris Agreement’s success depends on parties’ implementation of their Nationally
Determined Contributions (NDCs) towards the Paris Agreement’s goals. In these
climate action plans, most developing countries make their mitigation and
adaptation contributions conditional upon receiving international support (ﬁnance,
technology transfer and/or capacity building). While provision of support for NDC
implementation could enhance equity among countries, the feasibility of NDC
implementation might be challenged by the large number of conditional NDCs.
This paper addresses the implications of this tension based on an analysis of all 168
NDCs. We ﬁnd that feasibility is challenged because conditions applied to NDCs are
often not well deﬁned. Moreover, the costs of implementing all conditional
contributions are too high to be covered by existing promises of support from
developed countries, even if the entire annual $100 billion of climate ﬁnance were
earmarked for NDC implementation. Consistent with principles of equity and the
prioritization in the Paris Agreement, a higher proportion of Least Developed
Countries (LDCs) and Small Island Developing States (SIDS) have conditional NDCs
than do other countries. However, diﬀerences between the distribution of countries
requesting support and those currently receiving support, in particular among
middle-income countries, demonstrates potential tensions between feasibility and
equity. The article concludes with recommendations on how cost estimates and
updated NDCs can be strengthened to ensure support for NDC implementation is
targeted more equitably and cost-eﬀectively.
Key policy insights
. Support requested by developing countries to implement conditional NDCs far
exceeds existing funding pledges.
. Diﬀerences between existing patterns of ﬁnancial assistance, and those implied by
requests under conditional NDCs, mean that supporting NDCs may require a
signiﬁcant shift in provider countries’ priorities for allocating climate ﬁnance. This
may challenge feasibility.
. The Paris Agreement’s provisions on prioritizing LDCs and SIDS oﬀer valuable
guidance in making diﬃcult choices on allocating support.
. To increase the likelihood of attracting support, developing countries (assisted by
capacity building as needed), should include credible cost estimates in future NDCs
and formulate investment plans.
. By outlining plans to mobilize support in their NDCs, developed countries can
reassure developing countries that raising the ambition of NDCs is feasible.
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1. Introduction
Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) were key to securing the adoption of the Paris Agreement in 2015
and will be instrumental to implementing it over the coming decades. These climate action plans have three key
features. First, NDCs are universal: virtually every country that is a party to the United Nations Framework Con-
vention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) has submitted an NDC.1 Second, NDCs give countries signiﬁcant ﬂexibility
to tailor their ambitions to national circumstances and priorities. In combination with countries’ widely varying
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, vulnerabilities, capacities and levels of development, the limited guidance for
NDC formulation provided by the Conference of the Parties (COP) caused NDCs to vary in scope and content
(Mbeva & Pauw, 2016). Third, the Paris Agreement creates ﬁve-yearly cycles of review and updating that are
designed to ensure that NDCs become more ambitious over time (UNFCCC, 2015a, Articles 4.3 and 4.9).
This article addresses the implementation of NDCs, or parts of NDCs, that the submitting Parties have made
conditional upon receiving international support in the form of ﬁnance, technology transfer and/or capacity
building.2 Of the 168 NDCs submitted to the UNFCCC at the time of writing, 136 are conditional on one or
more kinds of support (see Section 4). Conditionality is thus a critical but not yet thoroughly analyzed aspect
of NDCs (Hedger & Nakhooda, 2015; Pauw et al., 2018; Zimm & Nakicenovic, 2019).3 As Section 2 will explain,
support is a central and long-standing aspect of UN climate negotiations, and a key tool for improving
equity and ambition (see De Coninck & Bhasin, 2015; Pauw, Bauer, Richerzhagen, Brandi, & Schmole, 2014; Pick-
ering, Jotzo, & Wood, 2015; Rajamani, 2016), including in the context of NDCs (Lehr, Schalatek, & Keller, 2019).
However, if implementation conditions set out in NDCs are infeasible to fulﬁl or inequitable in practice, they
could become the Achilles heel, or weak point, of the NDC model. Such shortcomings would challenge both the
implementation of current NDCs and prospects for increasing the ambition of future updates of NDCs. Rather
than looking at the technical feasibility of NDCs (which requires detailed analysis of individual NDCs and
countries’ circumstances) this paper aims to understand the political and ﬁnancial feasibility and equity of
the conditions set out in NDCs at an aggregate level.
Section 2 ﬁrst describes theoretical justiﬁcations for support, its history in the UN climate negotiations, and
current allocation patterns. Section 3 describes the methods for assessing the equity and feasibility of con-
ditional NDCs. Section 4 presents the results of the empirical analysis and Section 5 concludes.
2. Provision of support in the UN climate regime
2.1 Equity and feasibility of international support
Many scholars see equity as a key reason for providing international support to address climate change (Morgan
& Waskow, 2014; Rübbelke, 2011). One prominent equity-based justiﬁcation for providing support is solidarity
between wealthier or higher-capacity countries and those that are poorer or have less capacity to deal with
climate change. A second major justiﬁcation is moral responsibility on the part of historically high-emitting
countries to remedy harm those emissions have caused (even if liability is contested, e.g. in the case of
adverse impacts of past GHG emissions) or to prevent causing future harm (see generally Dellink et al., 2009;
Klöck, Molenaers, & Weiler, 2018).
In theory, any transfers from wealthier to poorer countries will enhance distributive equity internationally.
However, theoretical perspectives vary on what constitutes an equitable distribution of support and how
equity should be weighed against other factors. Moreover, although the 1992 Convention operationalized
equity through the principle of ‘common but diﬀerentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities’
(CBDR-RC) (UN, 1992, Article 3.1),4 the UNFCCC has never formally adopted criteria to measure equity.
There is widespread agreement among scholars and policy-makers that, as a matter of equity, support for
adaptation should be prioritized for countries most vulnerable to climate change (Ciplet, Roberts, & Khan,
2015; Grasso, 2010; see also section 2.2 below). Some argue that since climate change mitigation delivers a
global public good, mitigation ﬁnance should ﬂow to those countries that can reduce emissions at lowest
cost (Bagchi, Castro, & Michaelowa, 2016). Others consider that because mitigation also delivers local goods
(e.g. reductions in urban smog and energy poverty), consideration should also be given to supporting countries
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with the least capacity to fund domestic mitigation measures (Halimanjaya, 2015). These two sets of countries
are often diﬀerent: while low-cost opportunities to reduce emissions are mostly found in rapidly emerging econ-
omies, the countries with the least ﬁnancial capacity include LDCs and other low-income countries.
A key concern for the mobilization of international support is that tensions may arise between equity and
feasibility, understood here as the likelihood that a given level of funding will ﬂow to recipient countries.
This resembles the tension identiﬁed in the broader development literature between allocating funding accord-
ing to recipient need (related to equity) or donor interest (related to feasibility), with the two considerations not
always aligned. Donor governments will generally have a stronger incentive to allocate aid to countries that co-
beneﬁt the donor country, and will ﬁnd it easier to justify such allocations to domestic constituencies (Berthél-
emy, 2006; McKinley, 1978; see also Doucouliagos & Paldam, 2009 for a comprehensive review of this literature).
Given that providers of ﬁnance cannot be legally compelled to support particular recipients, providers retain a
signiﬁcant amount of discretion over their allocation decisions. This means that requests for support that align
with providers’ preferences are more likely to be fulﬁlled. Providers’ preferences may not always follow prin-
ciples of equity but may reﬂect other motivations. Three of these motivations apply speciﬁcally to the case of
climate-related ﬁnance. First, providers may wish to support delivery of global public goods such as mitigation,
which beneﬁts both providers and recipients (Kaul, Grunberg, & Stern, 1999; Rübbelke, 2011). Second, Bagchi,
Castro, and Michaelowa (2017) ﬁnd that climate-related aid has sometimes been used by industrialized
countries as a bargaining tool to gain developing countries’ support in climate negotiations (see also Ciplet
et al., 2015, p. 78). Third, provider countries may wish to pursue their own commercial or political self-interest.
For example, support might help to promote export markets, inﬂuence technology-related regulations, manage
spheres of inﬂuence, or promote political alliances, even if those are unrelated to the cooperation problem at
hand. For example, Weiler, Klöck, and Dornan (2018) ﬁnd that recipient countries are more likely to receive adap-
tation aid from countries that are trading partners or with whom they have a former colonial relationship. These
ﬁndings suggest that tensions between feasibility and equity could also arise in implementing the support con-
ditions attached to NDCs.
2.2. Support in the UN climate negotiations
Support, and climate ﬁnance in particular, has been one of the most contentious issues in the climate change
negotiations. Under the Convention, developed countries pledged ‘new and additional’ ﬁnance to support
developing countries in preparing their national communications to the UNFCCC, as well as the implementation
of measures to combat climate change (Article 4.3). The Convention’s provisions on support recognize that
giving eﬀect to CBDR-RC involves more than a simple binary distinction between developed and developing
countries, and encompasses multiple forms of diﬀerentiation according to countries’ circumstances (Bodansky,
Brunnée, & Rajamani, 2017, p. 28). Thus the Convention calls on developed countries to assist particularly vul-
nerable developing countries in meeting the costs of adaptation (Article 4.4) and to ‘promote, facilitate and
ﬁnance’ technology access and transfer to ‘other Parties, particularly developing country Parties’ (Article 4.5).
Finally, the Convention states that its eﬀective implementation by developing countries ‘will depend’ on the
eﬀective implementation by developed countries of their commitments on ﬁnance and technology support,
taking ‘fully into account that economic and social development and poverty eradication are the ﬁrst and over-
riding priorities’ of developing countries (Article 4.7). This provision falls short of developing countries’ calls for
their obligations to be legally contingent on the receipt of support (Bodansky et al., 2017, p. 131). Rajamani
(2005, p. 104) argues that, pursuant to the principle of common but diﬀerentiated responsibilities, developing
countries remain obligated to fulﬁl their commitments under the Convention even if support is not forthcoming.
In the 2009 Copenhagen Accord, developed countries for the ﬁrst time quantiﬁed a pledge to mobilize
climate ﬁnance: US$100 billion annually by 2020 to support developing countries’ mitigation and adaptation5
‘in the context of meaningful mitigation actions and transparency on implementation’.6 Ever since, scaling up
climate ﬁnance towards this $100 billion target and the accounting of ﬁnancial ﬂows have been high political
and operational priorities for the negotiations (Weikmans & Roberts, 2017). These and other negotiations on
climate ﬁnance may have prompted developing countries to include conditionality in their NDCs in the run-
up to the Paris Agreement.7
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The Paris Agreement establishes a strong link between support and the degree of eﬀectiveness and ambition
of developing countries’ actions (Voigt & Ferreira, 2016). The Agreement recognizes that support is needed for
eﬀective implementation of the Agreement (Article 3); allows for higher ambition in developing countries’
actions (Article 4.5); and increases the eﬀectiveness of adaptation planning (Article 7.13).
The Paris Agreement also speciﬁes LDCs (Least Developed Countries) and SIDS (Small Island Developing
States) as countries that should be prioritized for support (see Table 1). Scaled-up ﬁnance from developed
countries should aim to ‘achieve a balance between adaptation and mitigation’, and take into account the
needs of developing countries, ‘especially those that are particularly vulnerable […] and have signiﬁcant
capacity constraints, such as the [LDCs] and [SIDS]’ (Article 9.4). In contrast to the Cancún Agreements
(para 95), Africa is not explicitly mentioned as a priority for support in the Paris Agreement (UNFCCC,
2011).
The 2018 Katowice Climate Package, which sets out the ‘rulebook’ for the implementation of the Paris
Agreement, acknowledges only implicitly the country prioritization set out in the Agreement. For example,
on support for NDC implementation, the Rulebook states that support will be provided to developing
countries to implement Article 4 (on mitigation and NDCs) in accordance with Articles 9, 10 and 11 of
the Paris Agreement (UNFCCC, 2018). The articles on climate ﬁnance (Article 9) and capacity building
(Article 11) include explicit references to LDCs and SIDS (see Table 1). Although the Katowice Climate
Package clearly emphasizes the primacy of mitigation in NDCs (Lehr et al., 2019), it also claims to be
‘without prejudice’ to the inclusion of other components (UNFCCC, 2018). Other such components could
include adaptation, capacity-building, climate ﬁnance and technology transfer, as argued by developing
countries (International Institute for Sustainable Development [IISD], 2015).
2.3. Priorities for allocating existing support
Available evidence on existing patterns of climate ﬁnance shows that countries that provide support have a mix
of allocation priorities. Around 65% of climate-related development ﬁnance ﬂows to middle-income countries,
compared with only 20% to LDCs (OECD, 2018a). Allocation priorities may vary across provider countries. For
example, multilateral development assistance is typically less oriented towards donors’ strategic interests
than bilateral assistance (McLean, 2015). Providers have more discretion over bilateral support than over
support channelled through multilateral climate funds. Since bilateral support makes up the majority of
public climate ﬁnance (UNFCCC Standing Committee on Finance, 2018), we may expect that bilateral providers’
strategic motivations will still have a signiﬁcant inﬂuence over the global allocation of support.
Table 1. Countries prioritized for support in the Paris Agreement.
Countries prioritized for support Country groups mentioned
Climate ﬁnance (cross-cutting) . Particularly vulnerable countries (Art 9.4) . LDCs
. SIDS
. Those with signiﬁcant capacity constraints (Art 9.4) . LDC
. SIDS
Mitigation ﬁnance . Not speciﬁed* . Not speciﬁed*
Adaptation ﬁnance . Countries that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse eﬀects
of climate change (Art 7.6)
. Not speciﬁed*
Technology transfer . Not speciﬁed (Art 10)
. Countries with speciﬁc needs and special situations (Preamble)**
. Not speciﬁed (Art 10)
. LDCs (Preamble)**
Capacity building . Countries with the least capacity (Art 11) . LDCs
. Particularly vulnerable countries (Art 11) . SIDS
*Prioritisation for general cross-cutting climate ﬁnance still applies. **In international treaties, preambular text generally has less legal weight
than the text of the Articles.
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2.3.1. Mitigation ﬁnance
Mitigation ﬁnance makes up the large bulk of private and overall climate ﬁnance, comprises more than half of
public climate ﬁnance, and mostly ﬂows to countries with high and fast-growing emissions (UNFCCC Standing
Committee on Finance, 2018). This distribution is often interpreted as reﬂecting provider countries’ preference
for the global public good secured by mitigation (Rübbelke, 2011). Halimanjaya (2015) ﬁnds that a mix of factors
is associated with higher receipts of Oﬃcial Development Assistance (ODA) for mitigation, including higher
emissions intensity, lower income per capita and better governance (see also Bagchi et al., 2016; Kim, 2019).
2.3.2. Adaptation ﬁnance
The distribution of adaptation ﬁnance is somewhat diﬀerent, with some studies ﬁnding that vulnerable
countries do receive more ODA for adaptation than others (Bagchi et al., 2016; Weiler et al., 2018). Between
2010 and 2015, more adaptation-related development ﬁnance commitments were allocated to low income
countries and LDCs than to higher-income groups, both in aggregate and per capita terms (OECD, 2017).
2.3.3. Technology transfer and capacity building
Data on the geographic distribution of technology transfer and capacity building support are less readily avail-
able and are complicated by the fact that both types of support may involve non-ﬁnancial (in-kind) as well as
ﬁnancial components (Garrett & Moarif, 2018). Accordingly, it is diﬃcult to identify clear trends in allocation pri-
orities for these types of support. However, available data suggests that the diﬀusion of mitigation technologies
to emerging economies – in which the bulk of global emission increases are expected – has dominated the rise
in technology transfer over the last twenty years. LDCs are still largely excluded from international technology
ﬂows, mostly because of their negligible participation in recent economic globalization (Glachant & Dechezle-
prêtre, 2017). Evidence from developed countries’ reports to the UNFCCC suggests that the bulk of capacity
building support is directed towards adaptation, but it is less clear which income groups receive more
support (UNFCCC, 2016).
3. Method
To the extent that scholarly literature deals with conditions associated with international funding, it primarily
addresses ‘conditionalities’ set by providers rather than recipients (Molenaers, Dellepiane, & Faust, 2015).
Fridahl, Hagemann, Röser, and Amars (2015) provide one of the few exceptions: they explore the relationships
between providers’ and recipients’ objectives in relation to developing countries’ requests for support to
implement Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Actions (NAMAs). Their study focuses mainly on parameters
such as sectoral focus and project modalities, whereas our focus is on recipients’ conditions for NDC implemen-
tation in terms of adaptation ﬁnance, mitigation ﬁnance, capacity building and technology transfer.
This article analyses all 168 NDCs submitted as of June 2019 based on the NDC Explorer. This online, inter-
active tool aims to enhance transparency and comparison of NDCs by using a universal set of categories to
capture the diversity in scope, content and level of detail of NDCs (see Pauw et al., 2016).
To better understand whether the conditions set out in NDCs are feasible and equitable, we make the follow-
ing key assumptions:
(1) The feasibility of NDCs receiving international support is higher if:
(a) the conditions are clearly expressed (section 4.1);
(b) the aggregate costs could, in theory, be implemented with the annual $100 billion climate ﬁnance
target (section 4.2);
(c) countries with conditional NDCs are eligible for support under the UNFCCC (section 4.3); and
(d) the distribution of requested support is compatible with the distribution of existing ﬂows of support
(section 4.4).
(2) The equity of requests for support for NDCs is higher the more the distribution of these requests addresses
the prioritization for support of LDCs and SIDS under the Paris Agreement (section 4.5).
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Regarding the clarity of NDCs (element 1a), neither the Paris Agreement nor the Katowice Climate Package pro-
vides guidance on what ‘clear’ conditions might consist of (UNFCCC, 2018). While our analysis does not provide a
quantiﬁed benchmark for assessing clarity, we provide illustrative evidence on challenges associated with ascer-
taining the extent to which NDCs are partly or fully conditional, and how conditions relate to cost estimates.
The costs element (1b) is addressed by calculating average cost estimates for adaptation and mitigation
where these are contained in NDCs and by applying these to those NDCs that are conditional upon ﬁnancial
support. Cost estimates on technology transfer and capacity building are sparse in NDCs and therefore not ana-
lyzed. Cost estimates of eight countries that only provide one single number for adaptation and mitigation com-
bined are also excluded because we could not perform the required cost breakdown into adaptation and
mitigation components (these combined cost estimates vary from $0.06 billion in São Tomé and Príncipe to
$73.04 billion in Egypt). Based on this comparison, we identify whether conditional NDCs could, in theory, be
implemented within the annual $100 billion target, if we assume that this target will be extended over the
decade 2021–2030 (resulting in overall funding of $1 trillion)8 and that all climate ﬁnance will be directed
towards conditional NDCs.
The eligibility element (1c) is addressed by analyzing whether the countries that make their NDC conditional
upon support are eligible for receiving support under the Paris Agreement, understood here as non-Annex I
(developing) country parties to the UNFCCC.
Finally, feasibility element 1d analyses the compatibility of conditional NDCs with current practices for allo-
cating support. It compares (i) the percentage of countries in selected country groups (LDCs, SIDS and the four
income group categories used by the World Bank) that make their NDC conditional with (ii) the percentage of
countries in each group that have received adaptation and mitigation ODA. As in previous studies on climate
ﬁnance allocation (e.g. Bagchi et al., 2016; Halimanjaya, 2015; Weiler et al., 2018), we use the OECD Development
Assistance Committee (DAC)’s data on ODA and its ‘Rio Markers’ system for classifying aid that is related to multi-
lateral environmental agreements in order to analyse mitigation and adaptation ﬁnance ﬂows (OECD, 2018b).
We take the average ODA ﬂows for the years 2013–2016 as an indicator of current allocation practice, focusing
on those ﬂows that have adaptation or mitigation as their ‘principal’ objective as done in previous studies.
Private ﬁnance and public ﬁnance ﬂows from multilateral development banks and dedicated climate funds
are excluded here because consistent data that allows for disaggregation by groups of countries is only available
for bilateral ﬂows. This part of the analysis also excludes technology transfer and capacity building because few
NDCs provide quantitative cost information for these types of support (see Section 4.2); quantitative information
on support ﬂows is not available; and support for technology transfer and capacity building is often included
under climate ﬁnance.
For the limited number of NDCs that include both cost indications and conditions, Section 4.4 also compares
ﬁnance requests with support received. Apart from this limited subset, it remains unclear what proportion of
partly conditional NDCs needs to be ﬁnanced through international support (see Section 4.2), and in our com-
parison we therefore assume full instead of partial conditionality. Given these data limitations, we only make
provisional observations rather than drawing conclusions.
Finally, in order to understand the equity of the conditions (element 2), we compare the NDCs’ conditions
with the Paris Agreement’s prioritization of support towards LDCs and SIDS (see Table 1). We use this as our
equity benchmark for three reasons. First, this priority provision reﬂects a view on equity that is widely
shared by both contributor and recipient countries. Second, these priority provisions largely align with the
theoretical literature on equitable allocation that tends to prioritize the most vulnerable and least capable
countries (see Section 2.1). Third, we did not want to base our analysis on a speciﬁc normative model of emission
or ﬁnance allocations, given lack of scholarly consensus about which model is preferable (see Kartha et al., 2018).
4. Results
Across the 136 countries that make their NDCs conditional upon at least one type of support, capacity building is
the most frequently requested type of support (113 NDCs), followed by mitigation ﬁnance (110), technology
transfer (109) and adaptation ﬁnance (79). Considerably more countries request mitigation ﬁnance than adap-
tation ﬁnance, and the average amount requested per country is also larger for mitigation ﬁnance (see Section
6 W. P. PAUW ET AL.
4.2). While this appears inconsistent with developing countries’ calls for more balanced allocation of ﬁnance
between adaptation and mitigation, it aligns with previous UNFCCC negotiations on the scope and content
of NDCs and with provider countries’ preference for mitigation ﬁnance (see sections 2.1 and 2.3). In relation
to technology transfer conditions, a majority of countries requests transfer of both mitigation and adaptation
technology (70), with 37 countries requesting mitigation technology only and two countries (Peru and
Tonga) requesting adaptation technology only. In the following subsections, we discuss the extent to which
the conditions put forward in NDCs are in line with the assumptions outlined in Section 3.
4.1. Clarity of conditions in NDCs
The NDC Explorer classiﬁes NDCs as being ‘fully conditional’ (the proposed contribution will only be realized if
support is provided), ‘partly conditional’ (a part of the contribution will be realized with own eﬀorts, but full
implementation requires external support), as ‘mentioning’ a speciﬁc type of support (without indicating that
its provision is required for implementation), or as not mentioning support. However, in many cases it is
diﬃcult to discern whether a contribution is partly or fully conditional, or whether the country simply views
the provision of support as desirable. Countries may, for example, use ambiguous language that does not
allow distinguishing the conditional from the unconditional part of the contribution (e.g. Egypt), propose a
clearly conditional contribution followed by additional measures without stating their conditionality (e.g. Hon-
duras), or acknowledge that further analysis is needed before identifying what part of the contribution will be
implemented with domestic funding (e.g. Kenya, Mongolia). Sometimes, contradictory indications of condition-
ality appear in diﬀerent sections of the NDC (e.g. Kiribati). Further evidence is provided in the next sections. It can
be concluded that the clarity of the conditions in NDCs is often low, which can compromise the feasibility of
implementation.
4.2. Cost estimates in NDCs
Could all conditional NDCs be achieved through existing pledges for support? This section ﬁrst analyses the cost
estimates in NDCs for mitigation and adaptation against the conditionality of NDCs to obtain an indicative value
for the cost of implementing conditional NDCs. These estimates should be treated with the utmost care. Their
quality varies, for four main reasons. First and foremost, there are large diﬀerences in their level of precision.
Some countries such as India and Iran present general aggregate cost estimations of unknown origin,
whereas others provide detailed breakdowns. Palestine, for example, itemizes its adaptation contribution into
81 projects with detailed cost estimates. Second, the implementation periods of the NDCs vary. Most countries’
contributions extend until 2030, whereas some end in 2025 (including the United States and Brazil) or have mul-
tiple end years (including South Africa and Senegal). Third, cost estimates are partial: many NDCs include esti-
mates for some sectors only. For example, Morocco states that its adaptation costs are at least $35 billion for the
water, agriculture and forestry sectors and describes other sectors without cost estimates. Fourth, the cost
amounts vary widely:18 NDCs include mitigation cost estimates below $1 billion, whereas South Africa
($1380.5 billion), India ($834 billion, partly conditional) and Ethiopia ($150 billion, partly conditional) together
make up 78% of the aggregate costs estimates. On adaptation, India ($205 billion, partly conditional), Iran
($140 billion, partly conditional) and Iraq ($136.5 billion) make up 52% of the aggregated cost estimates.
Cost estimates do not necessarily equate to countries’ needs for climate ﬁnance, and there is only a partial
overlap between countries that have conditional NDCs and those that include cost estimates. On mitigation, for
example, seven countries mention costs without attaching conditions to them, while 47 countries that do not
mention mitigation costs do make their mitigation contribution partly or fully conditional upon ﬁnancial support
(see Table 2 and Figure 1).
The fourth column in Table 2 indicates the average costs of implementation for those NDCs that are con-
ditional and include a cost indication. For example, the average costs of NDCs that are fully conditional on adap-
tation ﬁnance is $1.1 billion, based on cost estimates of nine NDCs.
If these average costs are extrapolated for the partly or fully conditional NDCs that do not include cost indi-
cations, the total costs of implementing all conditional NDCs would be $4.1 trillion. Climate ﬁnance needs will be
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lower, because a proportion of the costs of partly conditional NDCs is ﬁnanced domestically. The exact pro-
portion remains unclear for most countries. Mongolia, for example, states that international support needs to
cover 80% of its stated $3.4 billion of adaptation costs, but also that further analysis is needed to identify the
required support for the $3.5 billion mitigation cost estimate. Twenty-eight countries indicate what proportion
Table 2. Cost estimates, conditionality and extrapolated aggregated costs of implementation (based on Pauw et al., 2016).
Number of NDCs
with cost
estimates
Number of NDCs
with conditions
Average costs of
conditional NDCs
(billion $)
Total costs when extrapolating
average cost indications to all
conditional NDCs (billion $)
Proportion of costs covered
by international climate
ﬁnance pledges*
Adaptation 60 . 67 partial (38
with cost
estimates)
. 11 fully (9
with cost
estimates)
. partly
conditional: 19.3
. fully conditional:
1.1
1305.9 (1293.7 for partly
conditional NDCs and 12.1 for
fully conditional NDCs)
. partly conditional: 23.2%
. fully conditional: 100%
Mitigation 70 . 93 partial (52
with cost
estimates)
. 17 fully (11
with cost
estimates)
. partly
conditional: 29.5
. fully conditional:
2.8
2793.1 (2746.2 for partly
conditional NDCs and 47.4 for
fully conditional NDCs)
Note: The average cost of fully conditional contributions is lower than that of partially conditional contributions because the former are requested
predominantly by SIDS and LDCs, which are typically smaller countries and/or smaller economies.
*Assuming $1 trillion climate ﬁnance is available for NDC implementation from 2021 to 2030 (as outlined in Section 3).
Figure 1. Tree charts showing the number of NDCs that include cost estimates (in blue) and that are conditional upon support, for mitigation
(left) and adaptation (right). Based on data from Pauw et al. (2016).
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of their partially conditional mitigation and/or adaptation costs need to be covered through international
support. Their average indicates that 81% of the costs need to be covered by climate ﬁnance. Extrapolating
this percentage for all partially conditional NDCs is arguably far-fetched but would result in an indicative
total support requirement of $3.3 trillion. Using any other proportion for extrapolation that diverges from
this 81% ﬁgure (e.g. 50%, or lower and upper bounds) would be arbitrary.
As explained in Section 3, in order to understand whether international support can cover all conditional
NDCs, this paper assumes that the maximum available amount of international support for NDC implementation
is $1 trillion. This would be suﬃcient to cover the total costs of fully conditional NDCs as well as 23.2% of the
aggregated costs of all partly conditional NDCs.
This percentage is probably insuﬃcient to meet NDC implementation needs. On the one hand, the
UNFCCC calls on developed countries to meet the ‘agreed full incremental costs’ only (Article 4.3),
meaning the mitigation or adaptation component of an investment. This could reduce the climate ﬁnance
needs to implement conditional NDCs considerably. However, it is challenging for countries to ‘agree’ on
the incremental component of project costs or to determine them analytically (Bouwer & Aerts, 2006). On
the other hand, while climate funds such as the Green Climate Fund as well as developed countries (e.g.
through the NDC Partnership) aim to support NDC implementation, it is unlikely that all climate ﬁnance
will be earmarked for this purpose. Furthermore, this section might underestimate NDC implementation
costs. Most countries do not include cost estimates for technology transfer and capacity building, even
though these are often a condition for NDC implementation (see Section 4.4) and despite the negotiation
position of the developing countries that capacity building and technology transfer are not part of climate
ﬁnance (Lehr et al., 2019).
In summary, the costs of implementing all conditional contributions put forward by countries that are eligible
to receive support are too high to be covered by existing pledges of support from developed countries, even in
the unlikely event that the entire annual $100 billion target were spent on NDC implementation. This limits the
feasibility of implementing all conditional NDCs.
4.3. Eligibility for support
All the countries that submitted conditional NDCs are non-Annex I countries eligible for support under the Paris
Agreement, with the exception of Turkey which made its NDC conditional upon technology transfer. Parties
have recognized Turkey’s special circumstances as an OECD member state at an early stage of industrialization,
and have thus conﬁrmed its eligibility to receive support. However, this arrangement extends ‘at least until 2020’
(UNFCCC, 2015b, Dec. 21/CP.20), meaning Turkey might not be eligible under post-2020 implementation of the
Paris Agreement. Consultations are currently continuing on whether to extend Turkey’s eligibility post-2020
(Schneider, 2017). At the UN climate negotiations in Katowice in 2018, Turkey repeatedly and unsuccessfully
called for its removal from the Annex I list of developed countries so that it could receive funding (Climate
Tracker, 2018).
In addition, countries might not be eligible for support because of international sanctions. Iran received
hardly any adaptation and mitigation ﬁnance in the period 2013–2016 (OECD, 2018b) and made its NDC con-
ditional upon the removal of international restrictions and sanctions. The UN Security Council lifted its sanctions
on Iran in 2016 (UN Security Council, 2017). North Korea also makes its NDC conditional upon all three types of
support, but it is still subject to ﬁnancial sanctions by the UN and has received less than $1 million in adaptation
ﬁnance in the period 2013–2016 (OECD, 2018b).
Developed countries’ incentives to provide support to developing countries may also be inﬂuenced by
whether potential recipient countries are on the OECD DAC’s list of countries eligible for ODA. For example,
Uruguay, Chile and Seychelles made their NDCs conditional upon receiving mitigation ﬁnance; and Bahamas
and Oman made their NDC conditional upon receiving adaptation ﬁnance, but none of these countries are eli-
gible to receive ODA. However, ODA eligibility does not formally restrict the eligibility of countries to receive
support under the UNFCCC. For instance, the Global Environment Facility, in its role as an operating entity of
the UNFCCC’s Financial Mechanism uses the eligibility criteria decided by the COP rather than ODA eligibility
(GEF, 2018).
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In summary, eligibility to receive climate ﬁnance does not directly compromise the feasibility of the
implementation of conditional NDCs, with the possible exception of Turkey. Indirectly, however, other factors
such as sanctions and ODA eligibility might adversely aﬀect feasibility in the context of the funding gap as
described in Section 4.2.
4.4. Compatibility with current practice
Figure 2 below compares the proportion of countries in each country group that (i) make their NDCs conditional
on mitigation or adaptation ﬁnance and (ii) receive each type of ﬁnance. Two trends are apparent across both
types of ﬁnance. First, while the likelihood that a country will make its NDC conditional decreases with income,
this trend does not clearly match the allocation of existing support, where only high-income countries are
noticeably less likely to receive support than other income groups. Upper-middle income countries show the
biggest gap between requests and receipts. Second, the share of countries that make their NDC conditional
is always lower than the share of countries that have received support for mitigation or adaptation (2013–
2016) for every country grouping except for mitigation ﬁnance received by high-income countries. One possible
reason for this diﬀerence are the data limitations mentioned in section 3, which mean that we can only compare
whether (not how much) support has been received or requested. In Figure 2, a country is counted as receiving
support as long as the dollar value of support received is greater than zero, even if the amount is trivial com-
pared to the size of the country’s economy or population. Introducing a minimum monetary threshold when
assessing whether a country has received support would, however, add an element of arbitrariness into the
comparison.
Beyond these common trends, some diﬀerences emerge between mitigation and adaptation ﬁnance. One
hundred and ten countries make their mitigation contribution conditional on receiving mitigation ﬁnance.
These countries comprise 83% of the 133 countries that received support for mitigation in 2013–2016. In
Figure 2. Percentage of countries per group that make their NDCs conditional on mitigation or adaptation ﬁnance, compared to percentage of
countries per group that are recipients of existing ﬂows.
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contrast, only 79 countries make their adaptation contribution conditional on receiving adaptation ﬁnance. This
is only 59% of the 134 countries that received support for adaptation in 2013–2016. Accordingly, the gap
between requests and receipts of adaptation ﬁnance is large across almost all country groups.
Bearing in mind the data limitations outlined in Sections 3 and 4.2, three further observations can be made
for both mitigation and adaptation when exploring how cost estimates of conditional NDCs relate to bilateral
climate ﬁnance received (see also the supplementary online material). First, in general, the cost indications
for the NDC implementation period (2021–2030) are far above the levels of support that countries have received
(2013–2016). Second, it is not possible to detect clear trends among LDCs and SIDS or other developing
countries when requests and receipts are compared. Third, the lack of such clear trends is exacerbated by pro-
minent outliers. On adaptation, for example, Iran is the only country that includes a very high conditional cost
indication but has hardly received any ﬁnance (as explained in Section 4.3). India, and to a certain extent also
Pakistan, have both high partly conditional cost indications and received high aggregate amounts of support,
but both receive relatively little on a per capita basis. On a per capita basis, outliers Tunisia and the Dominican
Republic are among the largest recipients of adaptation ﬁnance but put forward relatively low conditional cost
indications for adaptation in their NDCs. On mitigation, outliers include India, which both receives the largest
amount of mitigation ﬁnance and has the highest cost indication; and Bangladesh and Morocco, which have
a relatively low cost indication compared to the mitigation ﬁnance they have received. On a per capita basis,
the outliers are all smaller economies. While Botswana and Djibouti have relatively high cost indications com-
pared to receipts, Tuvalu and Nauru receive relatively large amounts of mitigation ﬁnance compared to their
cost indications.
In summary, the number of conditional NDCs is much lower than the number of countries that have received
climate ﬁnance over recent years, particularly for adaptation. This may seem positive for feasibility if it means
that supporting conditional NDCs requires scaling up support to existing partner countries rather than develop-
ing entirely new partnerships. Paradoxically, however, this may also reduce feasibility as scarce climate ﬁnance
resources will need to be divided over a group of countries far larger than just those with conditional NDCs.
Divergent patterns of requests and receipts across income groups may also reduce feasibility if supporting
NDCs requires a signiﬁcant shift in provider countries’ geographic priorities for allocating climate ﬁnance.
4.5. Equity
To assess the extent to which the conditions in NDCs could enhance equity, we compare their geographic dis-
tribution with the groups prioritized for support in the Paris Agreement (LDCs and SIDS). Figure 3 below displays
the types of conditions developing countries attach to their NDCs according to their membership of these pri-
ority groups.
Several broad trends emerge across all types of support. First, a larger proportion of LDCs and SIDS include
conditions than the other developing countries. This is roughly consistent with principles of equity, although the
proportion of other countries making their NDCs conditional remains high. Second, although a higher pro-
portion of LDCs have conditional NDCs overall (when partly and fully conditional NDCs are combined), SIDS
have the largest proportion of fully conditional NDCs. The Paris Agreement does not suggest any relative priority
of supporting LDCs compared to SIDS, although one could infer that a country that is both an LDC and a SIDS
would be accorded somewhat higher priority compared to a country that is one but not the other (e.g. a high-
income SIDS or a non-SIDS LDC). Next, we turn to trends relating to individual types of support.
4.5.1. Mitigation ﬁnance
Overall, 64 (or 58%) of the countries putting forward mitigation ﬁnance as a condition are either LDCs or SIDS (or
both). When looking only at NDCs that are fully conditional upon mitigation ﬁnance support, the role of LDCs
and SIDS status is even more pronounced. Out of the 18 countries making their NDCs fully conditional on miti-
gation support, 16 are LDCs or SIDS. Looking beyond the groupings prioritized for support in the Paris Agree-
ment to gain a more nuanced picture, it is evident from Figure 2 that lower-income countries are more likely to
submit conditions on mitigation ﬁnance than higher-income countries. Of the 18 developing countries that do
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not mention mitigation ﬁnance in their NDCs, 14 are high or upper middle-income countries. This is consistent
with the solidarity justiﬁcation for allocating support to countries with the least capacity (see section 2.1).
Nevertheless, seven out of the nine SIDS making their NDCs fully conditional (and 13 out of the 23 SIDS
making them partly conditional) on mitigation support are classiﬁed as high income or upper middle
income. They may thus have the capacity to address climate change mitigation through domestic resources
to a certain extent. In their NDCs, these countries tend to justify their conditions based on their high vulnerability
and small share of global emissions. While the former justiﬁcation is more applicable to adaptation ﬁnance than
to mitigation ﬁnance, the latter justiﬁcation is in line with the argument that those who have contributed the
most to global GHG emissions have the highest responsibility and should support those who have contributed
the least (see section 2.1).
4.5.2. Adaptation ﬁnance
Sixty-two per cent of the countries that put forward conditional adaptation contributions are SIDS and LDCs. As
with mitigation ﬁnance, the proportion of SIDS and LDCs that include conditions is much higher than the pro-
portion of other developing countries that do so. This aligns with the prioritization of these countries in the Paris
Agreement. In addition, as shown in Figure 2, lower-income countries are more likely to submit conditions on
adaptation ﬁnance than higher-income countries. Responding to these conditions would be in line with equity-
based justiﬁcations of solidarity and responsibility. However, in contrast to the responsibility justiﬁcation, the
solidarity justiﬁcation is less compelling in the case of a high-income (and therefore potentially high-capacity)
SIDS like the Bahamas, which put forward an NDC that is fully conditional on adaptation ﬁnance. Similarly, in the
context of the ﬁnancing gap (see Section 4.2) solidarity would not justify placing a high priority on supporting
the fully conditional NDCs of six upper-middle income countries (among which four are SIDS) or the partly con-
ditional NDCs of two high-income countries (Oman and Venezuela).9 This is despite these countries eligibility for
support (see Section 4.3).
Figure 3. Percentage of priority groups under the Paris Agreement and other developing countries that include conditions for each type of
support in their NDCs.
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4.5.3. Technology transfer
Thirty-eight LDCs and 29 SIDS make their NDC conditional on technology transfer, as do 50 middle-income
countries. The fact that 79% of the LDCs make their NDCs conditional on receiving technology transfer is in
line with the prioritization in the Paris Agreement, albeit through the preamble, rather than the operative
text of Article 10 on technology transfer which only refers to ‘developing countries’ (see Table 1: SIDS are not
mentioned in the preamble). However, the diﬀerence between the proportion of priority and non-priority
countries seeking technology transfer is not as large as for other types of support. Although vulnerable countries
could be expected to request adaptation-focussed technologies, the majority of LDCs and SIDS request technol-
ogy transfer support for both mitigation and adaptation, and where this is not the case, the focus is on mitiga-
tion. This may reﬂect that existing ﬂows of ﬁnance continue to prioritize mitigation technologies overall.
4.5.4. Capacity-building
The bulk (58% or 65 countries) of NDCs with capacity-building conditions are put forward by LDCs and SIDS.
While this is largely consistent with equity priorities under the Paris Agreement, it is notable that six of the
SIDS that include capacity-building conditions in their NDCs are high-income countries (Antigua and
Barbuda, the Bahamas, Bahrain, Barbados, Cook Islands, and Niue). In addition, six other high-income countries
include capacity-building conditions in their NDCs (Bahrain, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emi-
rates, and Venezuela). In the latter group of countries, oil makes up a substantial share of exports and govern-
ment revenue. Fossil-fuel dependent countries may be inclined to argue for capacity-building support and
technology transfer, because assistance for economic diversiﬁcation to manage the domestic economic
eﬀects of ambitious international mitigation eﬀorts (the ‘impacts of the implementation of response measures’
in UNFCCC parlance) is not readily classed as mitigation or adaptation support (compare UN, 1992, Article 4.8
and 4.10, 2015a, Article 4.15). Given the economic resources at their disposal, we would not expect high-
income countries – particularly non-SIDS – to be a high priority to receive support based on the solidarity jus-
tiﬁcation outlined in section 2.1, although the responsibility justiﬁcation could warrant capacity building for
adaptation in the SIDS among them.
In summary, the country groups prioritized in the Paris Agreement are more likely to make their NDCs con-
ditional than other developing countries. However, a substantial number of countries that are neither SIDS nor
LDCs make their NDCs conditional. Importantly, these countries remain eligible for support (see Section 4.3), but
even with scaled-up ﬁnancial resources diﬃcult allocation choices will need to be made, and the Paris Agree-
ment’s provisions on priority groups oﬀer valuable guidance in making those choices.
5. Conclusion and recommendations
This paper analyzed the feasibility and equity implications of conditional NDCs. Conditionality is common in
NDCs, but it is often neither well deﬁned nor described. This paper demonstrates that the costs of implementing
all conditional contributions put forward by countries that are eligible to receive support are too high to be
covered by support from developed countries, even in the unlikely event that the entire annual $100 billion
that developed countries have pledged to mobilize were spent on NDC implementation. This is despite the
fact that the number of conditional NDCs is much lower than the number of countries that have received
climate ﬁnance over recent years, in particular for adaptation.
Although a few emerging economies (Brazil, China, India, Chile and Panama) mention in their NDCs that they
are planning to provide support, it is unlikely that such ‘other Parties’ (UNFCCC, 2015a, Article 9.2) will ﬁll the
ﬁnancing gap. Similarly, even though private sources have a growing role in scaling up climate ﬁnance, the
need for public (non-commercial) resources remains large, and it is unlikely that the ﬁnance gap can be
closed by other contributors such as cities or philanthropists or (at least in the short term) by innovative
sources such as proposed levies on international transport.
At the same time, the conditions that countries put forward in their NDCs are broadly consistent with widely
held conceptions of equity in the sense that country groups prioritized in the Paris Agreement are more likely to
make their NDCs conditional. However, there is no guarantee that the most feasible scenario will also be the
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most equitable one. Tensions could arise between feasibility and equity if, for example, countries that provide
support prefer to prioritize upper middle-income countries, even though equity suggests that LDCs and SIDS
should be accorded higher priority. Tension could also arise when the allocation of support based on solidarity
towards countries with the lowest capacity does not justify a prioritization of support towards higher income
countries that are otherwise eligible to receive support and vulnerable to climate change. This could be an
issue in particular for high-income SIDS.
In summary, it is too early to say whether conditional NDCs will become the Achilles heel of the Paris Agree-
ment. However, until 2025, when a new climate ﬁnance ﬂoor is due to be negotiated, hard choices need to be
made on how climate ﬁnance can be targeted equitably and cost-eﬀectively to support NDC implementation.
Equally important, it remains uncertain how successive NDCs can become more ambitious without more clarity
on how higher ambitions will be ﬁnanced. Thus, conditional NDCs remain both an opportunity and a potential
vulnerability for ambition and equity.
So how to make progress from here? We conclude with four recommendations for action.
First, Parties to the Paris Agreement should build shared understandings about what contributions could be con-
ditional before 2024. The Katowice Climate Package provides guidance on NDC formulation that is mitigation-
centric and does not address the issue of conditionality. However, it does include a decision to continue con-
sideration on guidance in 2024. Given that the Paris Agreement is premised on universal participation, it is
reasonable to expect that most Parties’ NDCs would at least have an unconditional core. To reﬂect the equity
issues outlined in sections 2.1 and 2.2, countries such as LDCs and SIDS could include less demanding uncondi-
tional contributions, such as qualitative or costless contributions. Burkina Faso’s NDC, for example, already
includes negative – and zero-cost contributions. At the very least, the continuation of existing climate policies
should be treated as unconditional components.
Second, in order to implement current NDCs, countries requesting support should add substance to their
support needs. To increase the likelihood of attracting support, developing countries should set out credible
cost estimates and have suﬃciently detailed and feasible investment plans in place. This issue can be addressed,
for example, by examining and revising the existing plans and strategies that often underlie the NDCs (see Pauw
et al., 2016).
Third, provider countries should scale up capacity-building support for preparing future NDCs. In the Katowice
Climate Package, parties decided to provide capacity building for developing countries to prepare future
NDCs in general, and as part of the LDC Work Programme (FCCC/SBI/2018/9/Add.1) (see UNFCCC, 2018).
Such capacity building should also support the identiﬁcation of low-cost contributions as well as support for
estimating implementation costs. To maximize prospects for feasibility and equity, the cost estimates should
both be tailored to recipient countries’ circumstances and allow for comparability across NDCs.
Finally, developed countries should orient current support, and climate ﬁnance in particular, explicitly towards
supporting developing countries’ eﬀorts to implement their NDCs. Relatedly, in their NDC updates, developed
countries – and any other countries in a position to provide support – could add an informative (and preferably
quantiﬁed) outline of planned provision of support in their NDCs. Describing intended provision of support
would help to address equity and would have two other concrete beneﬁts. It would acknowledge the fact
that support is a contribution towards achieving the objective of the Paris Agreement; and it would reassure
developing countries that it is possible for them to raise the ambition of successive NDCs and implement
them successfully.
Notes
1. Once a party to the UNFCCC has ratiﬁed the Paris Agreement, its Intended Nationally Determined Contribution (INDC) auto-
matically converts into a Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC) unless that party decides otherwise (UNFCCC, 2015a, Dec.
22). This paper always refers to the latest document available.
2. In the UN climate negotiations, these three together are known as ‘means of implementation’ or ‘support’. This article uses the
latter term.
3. Some NDCs set political conditions that lie outside of the UNFCCC’s mandate and outside the scope of this article, including
political independence (Palestine) and the ‘reinstatement… of the prevailing national circumstances’ before the wars in Syria
and Iraq and the consequent refugee crisis (Lebanon).
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4. CBDR-RC reﬂects the political consensus that countries have a common responsibility to combat climate change and the
adverse eﬀects thereof, but that states may adopt and implement diﬀering commitments based on their diverse circumstances
and capacities, their historical contributions to GHG emissions and their speciﬁc development needs (see Pauw et al., 2014).
The Paris Agreement introduces a dynamic element to CBDR-RC by adding the qualiﬁer ‘in the light of national circumstances’:
as circumstances evolve, so too will the responsibilities of States (Rajamani, 2016).
5. All monetary values in this paper are in US$.
6. This pledge was formalised in the Cancun Agreements in 2010. This paper will refer to this as the ‘$100 billion target’.
7. Some parties (e.g. Marshall Islands and Papua New Guinea) also made their pledges under the Copenhagen Accord conditional
on international support.
8. Parties have agreed to set, before 2025, a new collective quantiﬁed goal from a ﬂoor of $100 billion per year. The deliberations
for this new collective quantiﬁed goal will start in 2020 (UNFCCC, 2015a, 2018). Since the outcomes of these negotiations are
unknown, this paper takes the $100 billion target as the relevant benchmark.
9. Of course, Venezuela’s classiﬁcation as a high-income country is probably no longer relevant given its current economic
hardship.
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